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uphiago/recon-skills55 installs

email-security

DMARC/SPF/DKIM check, email spoofing, SMTP test, and security header analysis

How do I install this agent skill?

npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill email-security
view source ↗

Is this agent skill safe to install?

  • Gen Agent Trust Hubpass

    This skill provides standard tools and procedures for auditing email security configurations such as SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. It includes instructions for testing SMTP relays and evaluating domain spoofing risks using established command-line tools.

  • Socketwarn

    1 alert: gptSecurity

  • Snykpass

    Risk: LOW · No issues

What does this agent skill do?

Email Security -- DMARC, SPF, DKIM

When to Use

  • During passive reconnaissance (Phase 1)
  • After initial DNS enumeration
  • DMARC p=none means DMARC enforcement is off; actual spoofability still depends on SPF/DKIM and the receiver's local policy
  • Critical for identifying phishing/business email compromise risks

Prerequisites

  • Explicit authorization, target boundaries, and rate limits for the target.
  • Tooling: dig, swaks.
  • A writable evidence directory: export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}" && mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR".
  • For any state-changing step (writes, uploads, credential attempts), obtain explicit confirmation immediately before the command.

How to Run

# SPF
dig +short TXT $target | grep "v=spf1"

# DMARC
dig +short TXT _dmarc.$target

# DKIM (common selector: google)
dig +short TXT google._domainkey.$target

# MX
dig +short MX $target

Procedure

The phases below are the procedure. Keep each probe bounded (--max-time), record evidence beneath OUTPUT_DIR, and stop at the stop-conditions listed in Pitfalls.

DMARC/SPF/DKIM Check Commands

# SPF
dig +short TXT $target | grep "v=spf1"

# DMARC
dig +short TXT _dmarc.$target

# DKIM (common selector: google)
dig +short TXT google._domainkey.$target

# MX
dig +short MX $target

Interpreting Results

ConfigMeaningRisk
v=spf1 ~all (softfail)SPF suggests blocking but doesnt enforceSpoofed emails may pass
v=spf1 ?all (neutral)SPF does nothingTotally permissive
v=spf1 include:amazonses.com ~allSES can send as domainAny AWS SES account can spoof
v=DMARC1; p=noneDMARC disabledZero spoofing protection
v=DMARC1; p=quarantineFailed emails go to spamPartial protection
v=DMARC1; p=rejectFailed emails rejectedFull protection
DKIM missingNo cryptographic signatureEmail can be forged

Email Spoofing via SMTP

# Test SMTP relay
timeout 3 bash -c 'exec 3<>/dev/tcp/TARGET/25; head -1 <&3'

# Send spoofed email via open relay (swaks)
swaks --to victim@target.com --from admin@target.com   --server TARGET --body "Spoofed email"

Headers That Indicate Security Level

HeaderValueMeaning
Authentication-Resultsspf=passSPF passed
Authentication-Resultsspf=failSPF failed
Authentication-Resultsdmarc=passDMARC passed
Authentication-Resultsdmarc=failDMARC failed
Authentication-Resultsdkim=passDKIM passed
Received-SPFPassSender authorized
Received-SPFSoftfailSender not fully authorized
Received-SPFFailSender not authorized
ARC-Authentication-ResultsAuthentication chain

AWS SES Spoofing (When SPF includes amazonses.com)

With v=spf1 include:amazonses.com ~all:

  1. Create AWS account
  2. Configure SES with your own domain (verified)
  3. Send email with From: admin@target.com
  4. SPF PASSES (because of include:amazonses.com)
  5. DMARC p=none -- the receiver applies no DMARC policy; delivery then depends on SPF/DKIM and local filters

Real-World Cases

Field observation (reported as CRITICAL after delivery proof): an organization with DMARC p=none on both domains and SPF include:amazonses.com, where a message spoofed via a separate SES account was delivered to a controlled inbox. The inbox-delivery evidence, not the p=none record alone, justified the severity.

Pitfalls

IssueSolution
SPF lookup limitDNS has 10 lookup limit for SPF includes
DKIM selector unknownTry common selectors: google, selector1, selector2, 2022, 2023
DMARC reportingrua=mailto: may leak authentication results to third party

Verification

# Check the DMARC policy first
dig +short TXT _dmarc.target.com
# p=none means no DMARC enforcement — it does NOT by itself prove spoofing.
# Proof = a spoofed message actually delivered to an inbox you control:
swaks --to you@your-inbox.example --from ceo@target.com \
  --server <an-smtp-relay-you-control-or-localhost> --header-From "ceo@target.com"
# Then inspect the delivered message's Authentication-Results header:
# dmarc=none or dmarc=pass with an attacker-controlled source = confirmed.
# Reject/quarantine or spam-folder delivery = not demonstrated.

Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.

<a href="https://skillzs.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/email-security">View email-security on skillZs</a>