email-security
DMARC/SPF/DKIM check, email spoofing, SMTP test, and security header analysis
How do I install this agent skill?
npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill email-securityIs this agent skill safe to install?
- Gen Agent Trust Hubpass
This skill provides standard tools and procedures for auditing email security configurations such as SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. It includes instructions for testing SMTP relays and evaluating domain spoofing risks using established command-line tools.
- Socketwarn
1 alert: gptSecurity
- Snykpass
Risk: LOW · No issues
What does this agent skill do?
Email Security -- DMARC, SPF, DKIM
When to Use
- During passive reconnaissance (Phase 1)
- After initial DNS enumeration
- DMARC p=none means DMARC enforcement is off; actual spoofability still depends on SPF/DKIM and the receiver's local policy
- Critical for identifying phishing/business email compromise risks
Prerequisites
- Explicit authorization, target boundaries, and rate limits for the target.
- Tooling:
dig,swaks. - A writable evidence directory:
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}" && mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR". - For any state-changing step (writes, uploads, credential attempts), obtain explicit confirmation immediately before the command.
How to Run
# SPF
dig +short TXT $target | grep "v=spf1"
# DMARC
dig +short TXT _dmarc.$target
# DKIM (common selector: google)
dig +short TXT google._domainkey.$target
# MX
dig +short MX $target
Procedure
The phases below are the procedure. Keep each probe bounded (--max-time), record evidence beneath OUTPUT_DIR, and stop at the stop-conditions listed in Pitfalls.
DMARC/SPF/DKIM Check Commands
# SPF
dig +short TXT $target | grep "v=spf1"
# DMARC
dig +short TXT _dmarc.$target
# DKIM (common selector: google)
dig +short TXT google._domainkey.$target
# MX
dig +short MX $target
Interpreting Results
| Config | Meaning | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| v=spf1 ~all (softfail) | SPF suggests blocking but doesnt enforce | Spoofed emails may pass |
| v=spf1 ?all (neutral) | SPF does nothing | Totally permissive |
| v=spf1 include:amazonses.com ~all | SES can send as domain | Any AWS SES account can spoof |
| v=DMARC1; p=none | DMARC disabled | Zero spoofing protection |
| v=DMARC1; p=quarantine | Failed emails go to spam | Partial protection |
| v=DMARC1; p=reject | Failed emails rejected | Full protection |
| DKIM missing | No cryptographic signature | Email can be forged |
Email Spoofing via SMTP
# Test SMTP relay
timeout 3 bash -c 'exec 3<>/dev/tcp/TARGET/25; head -1 <&3'
# Send spoofed email via open relay (swaks)
swaks --to victim@target.com --from admin@target.com --server TARGET --body "Spoofed email"
Headers That Indicate Security Level
| Header | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication-Results | spf=pass | SPF passed |
| Authentication-Results | spf=fail | SPF failed |
| Authentication-Results | dmarc=pass | DMARC passed |
| Authentication-Results | dmarc=fail | DMARC failed |
| Authentication-Results | dkim=pass | DKIM passed |
| Received-SPF | Pass | Sender authorized |
| Received-SPF | Softfail | Sender not fully authorized |
| Received-SPF | Fail | Sender not authorized |
| ARC-Authentication-Results | Authentication chain |
AWS SES Spoofing (When SPF includes amazonses.com)
With v=spf1 include:amazonses.com ~all:
- Create AWS account
- Configure SES with your own domain (verified)
- Send email with From: admin@target.com
- SPF PASSES (because of include:amazonses.com)
- DMARC p=none -- the receiver applies no DMARC policy; delivery then depends on SPF/DKIM and local filters
Real-World Cases
Field observation (reported as CRITICAL after delivery proof): an organization with DMARC p=none on both domains and SPF include:amazonses.com, where a message spoofed via a separate SES account was delivered to a controlled inbox. The inbox-delivery evidence, not the p=none record alone, justified the severity.
Pitfalls
| Issue | Solution |
|---|---|
| SPF lookup limit | DNS has 10 lookup limit for SPF includes |
| DKIM selector unknown | Try common selectors: google, selector1, selector2, 2022, 2023 |
| DMARC reporting | rua=mailto: may leak authentication results to third party |
Verification
# Check the DMARC policy first
dig +short TXT _dmarc.target.com
# p=none means no DMARC enforcement — it does NOT by itself prove spoofing.
# Proof = a spoofed message actually delivered to an inbox you control:
swaks --to you@your-inbox.example --from ceo@target.com \
--server <an-smtp-relay-you-control-or-localhost> --header-From "ceo@target.com"
# Then inspect the delivered message's Authentication-Results header:
# dmarc=none or dmarc=pass with an attacker-controlled source = confirmed.
# Reject/quarantine or spam-folder delivery = not demonstrated.
How can the creator link this skill?
Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.
<a href="https://skillzs.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/email-security">View email-security on skillZs</a>