mcp-authoring

19 — MCP Authoring

Three primitive types:

• Tools — callable functions (JSON schema input → structured output). Model decides when to call. "Do something."
• Resources — addressable content (files, DB rows, feeds) returned as text/binary. "Read something."
• Prompts — reusable templates with typed args. "Fill and inject."

Source authority: modelcontextprotocol.io/introduction, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk NPM.

When to author an MCP server

Build when:

• A REST API/Worker would provide genuine agent value and schema-wrapping cost < benefit
• Tool set needs sharing across multiple Claude sessions without copy-pasting prompts
• CF Worker owns business logic and you want Claude persistent auth-aware access (HTTP transport = zero extra infra)
• Extending the forge pipeline (--target=mcp-server — see forge-mcp-from-openapi.md)

Do NOT build when a simple [[hono-api]] route + direct fetch suffices — MCP adds SDK overhead not justified for one-off integrations.

Architecture

Claude Code / Claude Desktop
        │ JSON-RPC 2.0
        ▼
 ┌──────────────┐
 │  MCP Server  │
 │  ┌────────┐  │
 │  │ tools  │  │  ← JSON-schema validated inputs + Zod-validated outputs
 │  ├────────┤  │
 │  │resourc.│  │  ← URI-addressed, MIME-typed
 │  ├────────┤  │
 │  │prompts │  │  ← Named templates with typed args
 │  └────────┘  │
 └──────────────┘
        │
        ▼
 External system (D1 / R2 / Vectorize / external API)

Every tool input: z.parse() before hitting the system. Every result: Zod-validated before returning. Per [[contract-first-ai]] and [[zod-everywhere]].

Transport decision

Criterion	stdio	HTTP + SSE
Where it runs	Local process, same machine as Claude	Any origin — CF Workers, remote server
Auth	None (process-level trust)	HTTP headers, Bearer tokens, CF Zero Trust
Session state	Process lifetime	DO / KV per session ID
Streaming	Native (stdout)	SSE (text/event-stream)
Setup	~/.claude.json mcpServers entry	CF Worker deploy + .claude.json remote entry
Best for	Dev tools, local scripts, secret-laden CLIs	Shared team tools, SaaS integrations, per-user auth

Per [[cloudflare-lock-in-is-leverage]]: prefer HTTP on CF Workers over any third-party MCP host.

.claude.json registration

stdio server

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "my-local-tool": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/mcp-server/dist/index.js"],
      "env": { "DB_PATH": "/Users/Apple/data/mydb.sqlite" }
    }
  }
}

HTTP server (CF Workers)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "my-worker-tool": {
      "url": "https://my-mcp.workers.dev/mcp",
      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer ${MY_MCP_TOKEN}" }
    }
  }
}

Place at ~/.claude.json (global) or .claude.json at repo root (project-scoped).

Sub-modules

• stdio-server-template.md — complete TypeScript stdio server with sample tool + resource + prompt
• http-server-on-workers.md — Hono + MCP SDK + SSE on CF Workers, wrangler.toml, auth
• forge-mcp-from-openapi.md — plan for extending bin/forge-skill-from-openapi.mjs to emit MCP servers

Quality gates (every MCP server)

1. All tool inputs have a Zod schema — never accept raw unknown
2. All tool results conform to a Zod output schema before returning
3. Errors return MCP isError: true with structured { code, message } — never throw raw JS errors
4. Every tool description ≤2 sentences, specific enough for an LLM to decide when to call it
5. No secret values in tool schemas or resource URIs — pass via env block in .claude.json
6. Smoke-test with npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector before registering

Cross-links

• [[cloudflare-lock-in-is-leverage]] — Workers HTTP transport over any third-party MCP host
• [[ai-agent-supervisor]] — MCP tools are the supervised boundary for agent actions
• [[contract-first-ai]] — Zod at every tool boundary
• [[hono-api]] — HTTP transport built on Hono
• 05-architecture-and-stack/cf-agents-do-pattern.md — stateful MCP sessions via Durable Objects
• rules/ai-agent-security.md — tool scope minimization, input sanitization, rate limiting