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laurigates/claude-plugins64 installs

claude-security-settings

Claude Code security settings: permission wildcards, shell operator protections, project-level allowlists. Use when auditing or hardening .claude/settings.json permissions.

How do I install this agent skill?

npx skills add https://github.com/laurigates/claude-plugins --skill claude-security-settings
view source ↗

Is this agent skill safe to install?

  • Gen Agent Trust Hubpass

    This skill provides security documentation and configuration guidance for hardening the Claude Code agent environment. It defines best practices for permission wildcards, shell operator protections, and project-level security settings, encouraging the principle of least privilege. No malicious patterns, obfuscation, or data exfiltration vectors were detected.

  • Socketpass

    No alerts

  • Snykpass

    Risk: LOW · No issues

  • Runlayerpass

    1 file scanned · No issues

What does this agent skill do?

Claude Code Security Settings

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when...Use configure-claude-plugins instead when...
You need the permission-wildcard syntax, shell-operator protections, and project-level allowlist patternsYou want to wire a project's .claude/settings.json to the marketplace and enable plugins end-to-end
You are auditing or hardening an existing .claude/settings.json against the documented security conventionsYou want runtime detection of marketplace enrollment and enabledPlugins before changing settings
Another skill needs to cite the canonical permission-wildcard referenceThe user asked you to actually onboard a project to the laurigates/claude-plugins marketplace

Expert knowledge for configuring Claude Code security and permissions.

Core Concepts

Claude Code provides multiple layers of security:

  1. Permission wildcards - Granular tool access control
  2. Shell operator protections - Prevents command injection
  3. Project-level settings - Scoped configurations

Permission Configuration

Settings File Locations

Settings precedence, highest first (settings docs):

RankLevelSource
1Managedmanaged-settings.json, an MDM policy, or server-managed settings. No other level overrides it
2Command line--settings <file-or-json>, for that session only
3Project local.claude/settings.local.json (kept out of git)
4Shared project.claude/settings.json (committed)
5User~/.claude/settings.json (all projects)

What matters for hardening: permissions.allow/deny lists merge across levels rather than override, and a tool denied at any level cannot be allowed by any other level. A user-level deny blocks a project-level allow, and the reverse (permissions docs). Put a guarantee in deny at the widest level you control; put an org-wide guarantee in managed settings. The full hierarchy, trust rules and per-key exceptions are in health-plugin:settings-configuration.

Permission Structure

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "Bash(git status *)",
      "Bash(npm run *)"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "Bash(rm -rf *)",
      "Bash(sudo *)"
    ]
  }
}

Wildcard Permission Patterns

Syntax

Bash(command *)
  • Bash() - Tool identifier
  • command - Command prefix to match
  • * - Wildcard suffix matching any arguments
  • :ask suffix - Always prompt for user confirmation (e.g., Bash(git push *):ask)

Permission Tiers

TierBehaviorExample
allowAuto-allowed, no prompt"allow": ["Bash(git status *)"]
askAlways prompts for confirmation"allow": ["Bash(git push *):ask"]
denyAuto-denied, blocked"deny": ["Bash(rm -rf *)"]

Pattern Examples

PatternMatchesDoes NOT Match
Bash(git *)git status, git diff HEADgit-lfs pull
Bash(npm run *)npm run test, npm run buildnpm install
Bash(gh pr *)gh pr view 123, gh pr creategh issue list
Bash(./scripts/ *)./scripts/test.sh, ./scripts/build.sh/scripts/other.sh

Pattern Best Practices

Granular permissions:

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "Bash(git status *)",
      "Bash(git diff *)",
      "Bash(git log *)",
      "Bash(git add *)",
      "Bash(git commit *)"
    ]
  }
}

Tool-specific patterns:

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "Bash(bun test *)",
      "Bash(bun run *)",
      "Bash(biome check *)",
      "Bash(prettier *)"
    ]
  }
}

Flag-Scoped Deny Rules: Use the Space Form

When a deny rule targets a specific flag (a force-push backstop is the canonical case), write it in space form — the trailing * enforces a word boundary, so the prefix must be followed by a space or end-of-string and the rule stops at the exact flag:

{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "Bash(git push --force *)",
      "Bash(git push -f *)"
    ]
  }
}

Gotcha — colon form widens to longer flags. The :* suffix ("Bash(git push --force:*)") has been observed prefix-matching the raw command string, so it also matched git push --force-with-lease … — silently hard-blocking the safe recovery form that stacked-PR workflows depend on. Deny rules cannot be overridden except via bypassPermissions, so the widening is a hard block, not a prompt (laurigates/claude-plugins#2038). Current official docs state an end-of-pattern :* is equivalent to the trailing space form, but the equivalence is not version-pinned in the changelog and the widening was observed in practice — the space form's word-boundary semantics are explicit, stable, and match what the permission dialog itself writes when you approve a prefix.

When auditing or generating deny entries, flag any entry ending in a flag followed by :* (e.g. --force:*, -f:*) and rewrite it to the space form.

Shell Operator Protections

Claude Code 2.1.7+ includes built-in protections against dangerous shell operators.

Protected Operators

OperatorRiskBlocked Example
&&Command chainingls && rm -rf /
||Conditional executionfalse || malicious
;Command separationsafe; dangerous
|Pipingcat /etc/passwd | curl
> / >>Redirectionecho x > /etc/passwd
$()Command substitution$(curl evil)
`Backtick substitution`rm -rf /`

Security Behavior

Claude Code splits a compound command on &&, ||, ;, |, |&, & and newlines, and matches each subcommand separately (permissions docs):

  1. An allow rule such as Bash(git status *) approves git status && rm -rf build only if every subcommand is allowed (by a rule or as a built-in read-only command); otherwise the command prompts.
  2. A deny or ask rule applies when any subcommand matches it, including one inside a subshell, a command substitution or a for body.

Auto mode (the default permission mode)

In auto mode there is no approval prompt for most actions. A command matching a narrow allow rule (Bash(git status *)) runs immediately; deny rules and :ask suffixes still resolve first in every mode. Anything else — including shell-operator compounds that no wildcard matches — goes to the safety classifier, which allows or blocks it; on a block Claude receives the reason and tries an alternative (3 consecutive or 20 total blocks pause auto mode and resume prompting). Broad rules (Bash(*), Bash(python*), Agent) are dropped on entering auto mode, so they buy nothing. Audit for: broad allow rules (dead weight), and destructive commands that rely on a prompt rather than a deny — under auto mode a prompt is not guaranteed. See .claude/rules/auto-mode.md.

Safe Compound Commands

For legitimate compound commands, use scripts:

#!/bin/bash
# scripts/deploy.sh
npm test && npm run build && npm run deploy

Then allow the script:

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": ["Bash(./scripts/deploy.sh *)"]
  }
}

Common Permission Sets

Ready-made allow lists for read-only development, full git workflow, CI/CD, testing & linting, and security scanning live in references/permission-sets.md — read it when composing an allowlist for one of those workflows.

Project Setup Guide

The four-step bootstrap (create .claude/, write project settings, gitignore the local file, add local settings) is in references/project-setup.md — read it when setting up a project's settings files from scratch.

Agentic Optimizations

ContextCommand
View project settingsjq '.permissions' .claude/settings.json
View user settingsjq '.permissions' ~/.claude/settings.json
Check loaded settings sources/status (the Setting sources line)
Validate JSONjq . .claude/settings.json

Quick Reference

Permission Priority

See the Settings File Locations table: managed, command line, project local, shared project, user. Permission lists merge across those levels, and a deny at any level wins.

Wildcard Syntax

SyntaxMeaning
Bash(cmd *)Match cmd with any arguments
Bash(cmd arg *)Match cmd arg with any following
Bash(./script.sh *)Match specific script

Deny Patterns

Block specific commands:

{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "Bash(rm -rf *)",
      "Bash(sudo *)",
      "Bash(chmod 777 *)"
    ]
  }
}

Flag-scoped deny rules (blocking a specific flag such as --force) must use the space form, never :* — see "Flag-Scoped Deny Rules: Use the Space Form" above.

Error Handling

ErrorCauseFix
Permission deniedPattern doesn't matchAdd more specific pattern
Shell operator blockedContains &&, |, etc.Use script wrapper
Settings not appliedWrong file locationCheck path and syntax
JSON parse errorInvalid JSONValidate with jq .

Best Practices

  1. Start restrictive - Add permissions as needed
  2. Use project settings - Keep team aligned
  3. Use specific Bash patterns - Bash(git status *) over Bash
  4. Script compound commands - For && and \| workflows
  5. Review periodically - Remove unused permissions

Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.

<a href="https://skillzs.dev/skills/laurigates/claude-plugins/claude-security-settings">View claude-security-settings on skillZs</a>