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dralgorhythm/claude-agentic-framework106 installs

threat-modeling

Identify and analyze security threats. Use when designing a feature with security implications, before implementing auth/input-handling code, or when an audit calls for a threat model. Covers STRIDE methodology.

How do I install this agent skill?

npx skills add https://github.com/dralgorhythm/claude-agentic-framework --skill threat-modeling
view source ↗

Is this agent skill safe to install?

  • Gen Agent Trust Hubpass

    This skill is a security-focused guide for performing threat modeling using the STRIDE framework. It defines agent-specific risks and provides procedures for auditing system designs. It contains no malicious code, remote downloads, or obfuscation.

  • Socketpass

    No alerts

  • Snykpass

    Risk: LOW · No issues

  • Runlayerpass

    1 file scanned · No issues

What does this agent skill do?

Threat Modeling

Procedure

  1. Map Attack Surface: Use Grep and Glob to find entry points and trust boundaries; sketch the data flow.
  2. Enumerate Threats: Work through STRIDE per component — Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege. Use Sequential Thinking to cover each category systematically.
  3. Trace Data Flow: Use Grep to trace user input → processing → storage, authentication token flow, and sensitive data paths, watching for injection and leakage points.
  4. Rate Severity: Classify each threat as Critical / High / Medium / Low per the definitions in .claude/rules/security.md — Critical and High findings MUST be fixed before merge.
  5. Record Findings: Document each threat with its STRIDE category, severity, and remediation.

Agent-Specific Threats

Beyond STRIDE, include this class whenever the design under review has a tool/model boundary:

  • Indirect prompt injection: a directive embedded in tool output (fetched web page, file contents, API response) that the model executes as if the user had typed it
  • Tool poisoning: a compromised or malicious MCP server/tool that returns crafted output designed to manipulate the calling agent
  • Instruction-hierarchy violation: content from a lower-trust source (tool output, retrieved document) overriding system- or developer-level instructions
  • Over-scoped tokens: credentials or API keys granted broader access than the task requires, widening the blast radius of a successful injection
  • Config-as-code execution paths: hooks, settings, and MCP definitions that execute automatically on checkout — see .claude/rules/security.md's "Untrusted Content & Prompt Injection" section

Threat Model Document

## Asset: User Database

### Threats
| Threat | Type | Severity | Remediation |
|--------|------|----------|--------------|
| SQL Injection | Tampering | High | Parameterized queries |
| Data Breach | Info Disclosure | Critical | Encryption at rest, access logging |

Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.

<a href="https://skillzs.dev/skills/dralgorhythm/claude-agentic-framework/threat-modeling">View threat-modeling on skillZs</a>