threat-modeling
Identify and analyze security threats. Use when designing a feature with security implications, before implementing auth/input-handling code, or when an audit calls for a threat model. Covers STRIDE methodology.
How do I install this agent skill?
npx skills add https://github.com/dralgorhythm/claude-agentic-framework --skill threat-modelingIs this agent skill safe to install?
- Gen Agent Trust Hubpass
This skill is a security-focused guide for performing threat modeling using the STRIDE framework. It defines agent-specific risks and provides procedures for auditing system designs. It contains no malicious code, remote downloads, or obfuscation.
- Socketpass
No alerts
- Snykpass
Risk: LOW · No issues
- Runlayerpass
1 file scanned · No issues
What does this agent skill do?
Threat Modeling
Procedure
- Map Attack Surface: Use Grep and Glob to find entry points and trust boundaries; sketch the data flow.
- Enumerate Threats: Work through STRIDE per component — Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege. Use Sequential Thinking to cover each category systematically.
- Trace Data Flow: Use Grep to trace user input → processing → storage, authentication token flow, and sensitive data paths, watching for injection and leakage points.
- Rate Severity: Classify each threat as Critical / High / Medium / Low per the definitions in
.claude/rules/security.md— Critical and High findings MUST be fixed before merge. - Record Findings: Document each threat with its STRIDE category, severity, and remediation.
Agent-Specific Threats
Beyond STRIDE, include this class whenever the design under review has a tool/model boundary:
- Indirect prompt injection: a directive embedded in tool output (fetched web page, file contents, API response) that the model executes as if the user had typed it
- Tool poisoning: a compromised or malicious MCP server/tool that returns crafted output designed to manipulate the calling agent
- Instruction-hierarchy violation: content from a lower-trust source (tool output, retrieved document) overriding system- or developer-level instructions
- Over-scoped tokens: credentials or API keys granted broader access than the task requires, widening the blast radius of a successful injection
- Config-as-code execution paths: hooks, settings, and MCP definitions that execute automatically on checkout — see
.claude/rules/security.md's "Untrusted Content & Prompt Injection" section
Threat Model Document
## Asset: User Database
### Threats
| Threat | Type | Severity | Remediation |
|--------|------|----------|--------------|
| SQL Injection | Tampering | High | Parameterized queries |
| Data Breach | Info Disclosure | Critical | Encryption at rest, access logging |
How can the creator link this skill?
Add the canonical catalog link to the repository README so users can inspect current installs and available audits. The publishing guide covers the complete discovery path.
<a href="https://skillzs.dev/skills/dralgorhythm/claude-agentic-framework/threat-modeling">View threat-modeling on skillZs</a>