security

Security Skill

Purpose: Find and report security weaknesses in code, scripts, authorized binaries, and repo-managed prompt surfaces, with honest coverage.

Use this skill for a caller-requested security review of code, a repository scan, authorized binary assurance, dependency risk, secrets, or offline prompt-surface redteam.

Critical Constraints

• Scan only repositories, binaries, and prompt surfaces the operator owns or is explicitly authorized to assess. Why: a security review does not grant access to third-party systems or proprietary material.
• Keep collection read-only by default; do not exfiltrate secrets, execute destructive payloads, or mutate policy/baselines to manufacture green. Why: the assessment must not become the incident or erase its evidence.
• Treat missing/error scanners as a coverage gap, never a clean finding; use --require-tools when complete tool coverage is required. Why: absent evidence is not evidence of absence.
• Use the current agent and local shell; do not start another runtime or orchestration substrate unless explicitly requested. Why: repository scanning is a bounded operation, not permission to fan out.
• Report findings and coverage gaps, then stop. Remediation, risk acceptance, reruns, promotion, and any ship or merge call are caller decisions. Name each finding's remediation class in a few words; do not write the patch, a plan, an owner, or a priority.

What every review reports

Apply these to every review, scripted or manual. They are the rules most often skipped:

1. Fail-open paths. For every guard, check, timeout, and exception handler on the surface, ask what happens when it errors or hangs. A control that grants access, skips a check, or continues as success on error is a finding even when its happy path is correct.
2. Borrowed identity. Trace the effective identity at each hop (user, service, token, default, hook). A hop where identity is assumed, defaulted, or inherited instead of verified is the borrowed identity failure mode and a finding.
3. Per-class coverage ledger. Walk every applicable class in the OWASP checklist (the attack pack for prompt surfaces), plus fail-open and identity, and give each a result: finding, clean, or not assessed. An unvisited class is a gap, never a clean. Chasing one lead to the exclusion of the taxonomy is the first-scent fixation failure mode.
4. Proven versus suspected. A finding is proven only when you ran a concrete input, request, or command and observed the behavior; capture it. A finding reasoned from the code is suspected, even with a candidate input; give that input and rank it below proven findings.

target:   <paths, endpoints, or binary>; authorization: <boundary>
findings: <id> <severity> <file:line> <class>: <what>
          proven: <input run> | suspected: <candidate input, why not run>
          fix class: <a few words>
coverage: <class> -> finding <ids> | clean | not assessed (<why>)
tools:    <scanner or command> -> ran | missing | error
hunt:     converged after <n> passes | unconverged | not run

Manual hunt

Code-level review and redteam passes work in any repository, with or without AgentOps tooling. Walk the ledger against the full surface and probe fail-open behavior where that is safe. Repeat full passes until one complete pass adds no new finding and no new coverage gap; that quiet round is the stop condition. If the budget ends first, report the hunt as unconverged. The quiet-round rule applies only to the manual hunt.

Scripted scans

Each selected scan runs once per request; a rerun is a new caller decision.

Surface	Entry point	Location
Repository gate (quick or full)	scripts/security-gate.sh	AgentOps repository root only
Composable suite for authorized binaries	skills/security/scripts/security_suite.py	this skill's scripts/
Offline prompt-surface redteam	skills/security/scripts/prompt_redteam.py	this skill's scripts/

• No gate script (any other repository): run the scanners the project already uses, such as a dependency audit, secret scan, or static analyzer, record each one that is absent as a coverage gap, and do the manual hunt.
• Redteam pack: the bundled attack pack targets AgentOps control surfaces. In another repository its cases fail with "no files matched target globs"; that is a pack mismatch, not a finding.
• Read the suite runbook before binary, policy, baseline, or redteam work.

This is the canonical security runbook. Suite policy gating produces machine-consumable outputs, including policy/policy-verdict.json when a policy file is supplied.

Repository gate

scripts/security-gate.sh --mode quick   # changed scope
scripts/security-gate.sh --mode full    # repository-wide

Add --require-tools when skipped scanners would invalidate the assurance claim. Checkpoint: preserve the exit code and verify the reported security-gate-summary.json exists and parses before triage; report the result as incomplete unless the selected artifact validator and process both succeed.

Scheduled automation runs the full gate against the intended branch and retains its artifact directory. A failing scheduled run creates actionable tracked work; AgentOps itself does not supply the scheduler.

Triage

1. Open the latest artifact and identify scanner, severity, file, and coverage gaps.
2. Reproduce the finding with the narrowest safe command; an unreproduced hit stays suspected.
3. Rank concrete findings and preserve coverage gaps.
4. Stop. Remediation, risk acceptance, and any later scan are new caller decisions. Do not downgrade, suppress, or update a baseline merely to pass.

Output Specification

Artifact directory: repository gates write ${SECURITY_GATE_OUTPUT_DIR:-${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/agentops-security}/<run-id>/; composable-suite and redteam runs use their explicit --out-dir.

Filename convention: repository gates require security-gate-summary.json (and raw summary.json); suite runs require suite-summary.json; redteam runs require redteam/redteam-results.json.

Serialization/schema format: security-gate-summary.json is JSON with nonempty mode, run_id, output_dir, and gate_status, numeric missing_tool_count, boolean require_tools, and object toolchain.

Validator command: with OUT=<security-gate-run-dir>, run jq -e '(.mode|type)=="string" and (.mode|length)>0 and (.run_id|type)=="string" and (.run_id|length)>0 and (.output_dir|type)=="string" and (.output_dir|length)>0 and .gate_status=="PASS" and (.missing_tool_count|type)=="number" and (.require_tools|type)=="boolean" and (.toolchain|type)=="object"' "$OUT/security-gate-summary.json" >/dev/null.

Output: the review report above; for scripted scans also the artifact path, command/exit code, mode, and gate status. Do not add an owner, next action, approval, release, ship, or retry decision.

Quality Checklist

• Target and authorization boundary are explicit; collection stayed within them.
• Every applicable class has a result; unvisited classes are listed as not assessed.
• Scanner availability and skipped/error coverage are visible in the report.
• Findings include severity, location, proven-or-suspected evidence, and a remediation class, with no patch, plan, owner, or priority.
• Artifacts contain no newly exposed secrets or unredacted sensitive payloads.
• The report distinguishes a passing scan from permission to promote, ship, or release.
• Suppressions, policy changes, baselines, and risk acceptance require explicit judgment.
• The report stops after evidence and contains no continuation decision.

Validation

Run the skill and redteam validators:

bash skills/security/scripts/validate.sh
bash tests/scripts/test-security-suite-redteam.sh

For a bounded suite smoke test, use an owned binary and a temporary output directory as shown in the suite runbook.

Troubleshooting

Problem	Response
Scanner missing/error	Record the coverage gap; install it or rerun with --require-tools when required
Local/CI mismatch	Compare scanner versions, config, mode, and both artifact directories
Suspected false positive	Reproduce narrowly; document any authorized suppression and its owner
Suite/baseline failure	Inspect the named compare/policy artifact; never refresh baseline reflexively
Redteam failure after wording change	Decide whether the control regressed or the attack-pack matcher needs intentional revision

Reference Documents

• references/security-suite-runbook.md — binary/policy/baseline/redteam commands and artifacts
• references/security.feature — repository-gate executable spec
• references/security-suite.feature — composable-suite executable spec
• references/owasp-checklist.md — OWASP Top 10 review
• references/agentops-redteam-pack.json — offline attack pack
• references/policy-example.json — starter policy